Boosting intelligence analysts’ judgment accuracy: what works, what fails? by Mandel, David R. et al.
Middlesex University Research Repository
An open access repository of
Middlesex University research
http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk
Mandel, David R. and Karvetski, Christopher W. and Dhami, Mandeep
K. (2018) Boosting intelligence analysts’ judgment accuracy: what
works, what fails? Judgment and Decision Making, 13 (6). ISSN
1930-2975 (Accepted/In press) 
Published version (with publisher's formatting)
Available from Middlesex University’s Research Repository at
http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/25593/
Copyright:
Middlesex University Research Repository makes the University’s research available electronically.
Copyright and moral rights to this thesis/research project are retained by the author and/or 
other copyright owners. The work is supplied on the understanding that any use for 
commercial gain is strictly forbidden. A copy may be downloaded for personal, 
non-commercial, research or study without prior permission and without charge. Any use of 
the thesis/research project for private study or research must be properly acknowledged with
reference to the work’s full bibliographic details.
This thesis/research project may not be reproduced in any format or medium, or extensive 
quotations taken from it, or its content changed in any way, without first obtaining permission
in writing from the copyright holder(s).
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact 
the Repository Team at Middlesex University via the following email address:
eprints@mdx.ac.uk
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 13, No. 6, November 2018, pp. XX–XX
Boosting intelligence analysts’ judgment accuracy: What works, what
fails?
David R. Mandel∗ Christopher W. Karvetski† Mandeep K. Dhami‡
Abstract
A routine part of intelligence analysis is judging the probability of alternative hypotheses given available evidence. Intelli-
gence organizations advise analysts to use intelligence-tradecraft methods such as Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH)
to improve judgment, but such methods have not been rigorously tested. We compared the evidence evaluation and judgment
accuracy of a group of intelligence analysts who were recently trained in ACH and then used it on a probability judgment task
to another group of analysts from the same cohort that were neither trained in ACH nor asked to use any specific method.
Although the ACH group assessed information usefulness better than the control group, the control group was a little more
accurate (and coherent) than the ACH group. Both groups, however, exhibited suboptimal judgment and were susceptible to
unpacking effects. Although ACH failed to improve accuracy, we found that recalibration and aggregation methods substan-
tially improved accuracy. Specifically, mean absolute error (MAE) in analysts’ probability judgments decreased by 61% after
first coherentizing their judgments (a process that ensures judgments respect the unitarity axiom) and then aggregating their
judgments. The findings cast doubt on the efficacy of ACH, and show the promise of statistical methods for boosting judgment
quality in intelligence and other organizations that routinely produce expert judgments.
Keywords: probability judgment, accuracy, coherence, intelligence analysis, recalibration, aggregation, coherentization
1 Introduction
Intelligence organizations routinely call upon their analysts
to make probability judgments and test hypotheses under
conditions of uncertainty. These expert judgments can in-
form important policy decisions concerning national and
international security. Traditionally, analysts have been ex-
pected to accumulate domain expertise and apply this along
with critical thinking skills to arrive at timely and accurate
assessments for decision-makers. In the US, developers of
analytic tradecraft (i.e., the methods developed within the in-
telligence community to support its analytic functions) such
as Richards Heuer Jr. and Jack Davis introduced so-called
“structured analytic techniques” (SATs) to support the ana-
lyst in the assessment process, but thesemethodswere largely
optional tricks-of-the-trade. That state of affairs changed fol-
lowing two notable geopolitical events (i.e., the September
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11, 2001, terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda and the 2003 invasion
of Iraq) that were attributed in part to striking intelligence
failures. These events prompted reviews of the intelligence
community with ensuing organizational reforms that, among
other things, aimed at debiasing intelligence analysts’ judg-
ments (Belton&Dhami, in press). In theUS, the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 mandated the
use of SATs in intelligence production and SATs became a
staple topic in most analytic training programs (Chang, Ber-
dini, Mandel & Tetlock, 2018; Coulthart, 2017; Marchio,
2014). Much the same set of organizational reforms was en-
acted in otherWestern countries such as the UK (e.g., Butler,
2004).
Although the number of SATs has skyrocketed over the last
decade (Dhami, Belton & Careless, 2016; Heuer & Pherson,
2014), as others have lamented in recent years (Chang et al.,
2018; Dhami, Mandel, Mellers & Tetlock, 2015; National
Research Council, 2011; Pool, 2010), there has been little
effort to test their effectiveness. Instead, most SATs have
been adopted on the basis of their perceived face validity
with the belief that, although imperfect, they must be better
than nothing. At the same time, the intelligence commu-
nity has rarely considered using post-analytic techniques to
improve judgment (Mandel & Tetlock, 2018). For instance,
Mandel and Barnes (2014) showed that intelligence analysts’
strategic forecasts were underconfident, but that much of this
bias could be eliminated by recalibrating their judgments to
make them more extreme (also see Baron, Mellers, Tetlock,
Stone & Ungar, 2014; Turner, Steyvers, Merkle, Budescu
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& Wallsten, 2014). Similarly, the accuracy of probabil-
ity judgments can be improved post-judgment by recalibra-
tion so judgments respect one or more coherence principles,
such as the axioms of probability calculus — a statistical
process called coherentization (Karvetski, Olson, Mandel &
Twardy, 2013). Karvetski et al. further observed that weight-
ing individuals’ contributions to aggregated judgments also
improved accuracy above the gains achieved using an un-
weighted arithmetic average. In the present research, we
examine the accuracy of intelligence analysts’ probability
judgments in an experimental task. We examine the effec-
tiveness of ACH as well as recalibration and aggregation
methods with the aim of addressing the prescriptive ques-
tion: what works — and what fails — to improve judgment
accuracy?
1.1 The Analysis of Competing Hypotheses
Technique
The Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH; Heuer, 1999;
Heuer & Pherson, 2014) is one of the most widely known
SATs, and one of only nine that is listed in the US Govern-
ment’s (2009) Tradecraft Primer (also see UK Ministry of
Defence, 2013). The US Government describes ACH as a
diagnostic technique whose main function is to externalize
analytic hypotheses and evidence. It further claims that ACH
helps analysts overcome common cognitive biases, such as
primacy effects, confirmation bias, and other forms of pre-
mature cognitive closure that can undermine the accuracy of
forecasts or other probabilistic assessments. The US Gov-
ernment also asserts that ACH “has proved to be a highly
effective technique when there is a large amount of data to
absorb and evaluate” (2009, p. 14), yet it does not cite any
evidence to support that claim. The UK handbook conveys
comparable exuberance for ACH, noting, “The approach is
designed to help analysts consider all the evidence in the
light of all the hypotheses as objectively as possible” (UK
Ministry of Defence, 2013, p. 14, italics added).
ACH includes several steps, but the core of the trade-
craft method involves generating a matrix in which mutually
exclusive and (preferably) collectively exhaustive (MECE)
hypotheses are listed in columns and pieces of relevant ev-
idence are listed in rows. The analyst then assesses the
consistency of each piece of evidence with each hypothesis
starting on the first row and moving across the columns. For
each cell, the analyst rates evidence-hypothesis consistency
on a 5-point ordinal scale (i.e., −2 = highly inconsistent, −1
= inconsistent, 0 =neutral or not applicable, 1 = consistent,
2 = highly consistent. However, only the negative scores
(−1 and −2) are tallied for each hypothesis. For instance,
if there were five pieces of information (i.e., five rows) and
Hypothesis A had ratings {2, 2, 2, 2, −2} and Hypothesis B
had ratings {0, 0, 1, 0, −1}, Hypothesis B with an inconsis-
tency score of −1 would be rated as more likely to be true
than Hypothesis A with a score of −2. In other words, ACH
requires that analysts disregard evidential support for hy-
potheses in the information integration process. This feature
of the method may have been motivated by a misapplication
of Popper’s (1959) ideas about the merits of falsification as
a strategy for scientific discovery. Popper’s claim that hy-
potheses could only be falsified but never proven pertained to
universal hypotheses such as “all swans are white” because
a single non-white swan is sufficient to disprove the claim.
Most hypotheses of interest in intelligence, however, are not
universal but rather deal with events in a particular context
(e.g., Iran is developing a nuclear weapon), and few could be
falsified outright by a single disconfirming piece of evidence
(Mandel, in press).
ACH also includes a subsequent evidential editing phase:
once thematrix is populated with consistency ratings, the an-
alyst is encouraged to remove evidence that does not appear
to differentiate between the alternative hypotheses. However,
there is virtually no guidance on how such assessments of in-
formation usefulness should be conducted. For instance, the
US Government merely instructs, “The ‘diagnostic value’
of the evidence will emerge as analysts determine whether
a piece of evidence is found to be consistent with only one
hypothesis, or could support more than one or indeed all
hypotheses. In the latter case, the evidence can be judged as
unimportant to determining which hypothesis is more likely
correct” (2009, p. 15). The UK handbook is more precise,
stating “For each hypothesis ask the following question: ‘If
this hypothesis were true, how likely would the evidence
be?’” (UKMinistry of Defence, 2013, p. 15; see also Heuer,
1999). Yet, it vaguely advises analysts to “pay most attention
to the most diagnostic evidence — i.e., that which is highly
consistent with some hypotheses and inconsistent with oth-
ers” (p. 17). If evidence is subsequently disregarded, then
analysts are expected to recalculate the sum of the negative
(inconsistency) ratings. These scores are then meant to re-
flect the rank ordering of hypotheses by subjective probabil-
ity, with the hypothesis receiving the smallest inconsistency
score being judged as most likely to be true in the set of
hypotheses being tested.
ACH is not a normative method for probabilistic belief re-
vision or hypothesis testing, but it has become an institution-
alized heuristic that intelligence organizations have deemed
to be effective without compelling reasons or evidence (for
additional critiques, see Chang et al., 2018; Jones, 2018;
Karvetski, Olson, Gantz & Cross, 2013; Pope & Jøsang,
2005; Mandel, in press; Mandel & Tetlock, 2018). As al-
ready noted, ACH disregards useful information about ev-
idential support for hypotheses and it requires analysts to
self-assess information utility without providing a clear def-
inition of utility, let alone a computational method for esti-
mating such utility. Perhaps even more fundamental is the
omission of a clear definition of consistency, which could
signify a range of meanings, such as the probability of the
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evidence given the hypothesis, the probability of the hy-
pothesis given the evidence, the plausibility or the necessity
of one given the other, or simply a subjective sense of the
representativeness of one to the other — namely, the rep-
resentativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). In
addition, ACH does nothing to ensure that analysts consider
prior probabilities or objective base rates when revising their
beliefs about hypotheses in light of new evidence. In sum,
there are many reasons to be skeptical about the effectiveness
of ACH.
Unfortunately, there is little scientific research on ACH,
and what exists must be interpreted cautiously for several
reasons, such as small sample sizes (e.g., Convertino, Bill-
man, Pirolli, Massar & Shrager, 2008; Lehner, Adelman,
Cheikes & Brown, 2008; Kretz, Simpson & Graham, 2012),
lack of control groups (Convertino et al., 2008) or appro-
priate control groups (Kretz et al., 2012). Moreover, virtu-
ally all published studies have omitted critical, quantitative
measures of judgment accuracy, focusing instead on distal
considerations such as whether ACH reduces (the highly
equivocal notion of) “confirmation bias” (Nickerson, 1998).
Yet, despite the many serious limitations of research on ACH
(and SATs, more generally), the intelligence studies litera-
ture has shown little concern regarding the lack of adequate
research to support the widespread use of SATs, including
ACH. Rather, a recent review article concluded that ACH
was “found to be effective and had a highly credible evi-
dence base. . . ” (Coulthart, 2017, p. 377). This conclusion
is unwarranted not only because of themethodological weak-
nesses noted earlier, but also because the extant findings are
at best equivocal. For instance, whereas Lehner et al. (2008)
find that ACH reduced confirmation bias in non-analysts, it
had no effect on analysts.
1.2 The present research
A central aim of our research was to examine how the ac-
curacy and logical coherence of intelligence analysts’ judg-
ments about the probability of alternative (MECE) hypothe-
ses depended on whether or not analysts were trained in and
used ACH on the experimental task. In addition to this SAT,
we also explored the value of statistical post-judgment meth-
ods for improving expert judgment, such as recalibrating
experts’ probabilities in ways that remedy certain coherence
violations (i.e., non-unitarity and/or non-additivity), and by
aggregating experts’ judgments using varying group sizes
and weighting methods.
We tested the effectiveness of ACH by randomly assigning
intelligence analysts from the same population to experimen-
tal conditions that either used ACH or did not. One group
of analysts was recently trained to use ACH as part of their
organization’s training and they were required to use ACH
on the experimental task. The other group of analysts was
drawn from the same analytic cohort (i.e., same organiza-
tion and taking the same training course) but they were not
instructed to use ACH (or any SAT for that matter) and were
not exposed to ACH training until after the experiment was
completed. The task, which involved a hypothetical scenario,
required analysts to assess the probabilities of four MECE
hypotheses that corresponded to four tribes in a region of
interest. Participants were asked to assess the probabilities
that a detained individual (i.e., the target) from the local
population belongs to each of the four tribes. Participants
were given the tribe base-rates and diagnostic conditional
probabilities for 12 evidential cues (e.g., “speaks Zimban”),
along with the cue values (6 present and 6 absent) for the
target. Furthermore, two tribes (Bango and Dengo, hereafter
B and D) were grouped as friendly (F), whereas the other
two (Acanda and Conda, hereafter A and C) were grouped
as hostile (H).
If ACH proponents’ claims about the technique’s effec-
tiveness are warranted, we should find greater probabilistic
judgment accuracy in the ACH condition than in the con-
trol condition. As noted earlier, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no clear evidence to support the claim that
ACH improves probabilistic judgment accuracy. Indeed,
one non-peer-reviewed study that compared various degrees
of ACH support (e.g., ACH on its own or with additional
training) across experimental groups found that accuracy
was best among those participants in the no-ACH control
group (Wheaton, 2014). However, insufficient information
was provided to interpret these results with any confidence.
In addition, if proponents’ claims about the effectiveness
of ACH in promoting soundness of judgment are true, we
might expect to find that analysts recently trained in and
aided by ACH produce probability judgments that are more
coherent than those unaided by ACH. We tested this propo-
sition by examining the degree to which probability judg-
ments in both groups respect the axioms of unitarity and
additivity. To do so, we drew on predictions of support
theory, a non-extensional descriptive account of subjective
probability which posits that one’s probability judgments
are a function of his or her assessments of evidential support
for a focal hypothesis and its alternative (Rottenstreich &
Tversky, 1997; Tversky & Koehler, 1994). Support theory
predicts an unpacking effect, in which the sum of the prob-
abilities assigned to a MECE partition with more than two
subsets of an event, x, exceeds P(x). Unpacking effects have
been shown in several studies (Ayton, 1997; Fox, Rogers
& Tversky, 1996; Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997; Tversky
& Koehler, 1994). For instance, in two experiments with
undergraduate participants, Mandel (2005) found that the
mean unpacking factor — namely, the ratio of the sum of
unpacked probability estimates to the packed estimate—was
2.4 comparing forecasts of terrorism (i.e., the packed fore-
cast) to forecasts of terrorism unpacked into acts committed
by Al Qaeda or by operatives unaffiliated with Al Qaeda.
No research has yet examined whether intelligence analysts’
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probability judgments are susceptible to the unpacking ef-
fect. In the present research, the unpacking effect would be
observed if P(A)+P(C) > P(H) and/or P(B)+P(D) > P(F).
According to the additivity axiom, these inequalities should
be equalities, given that A∩C =  and A∪C≡H; likewise B
∩ D =  and B ∪D≡F.
Extending our investigation into the coherence of analysts’
probability judgments, we further tested whether analysts’
judgments respect the unitarity axiom, which states that the
probabilities assigned to a MECE set of hypotheses should
sum to unity. Support theory predicts that partitions of a
sample space into more than two subsets will yield an un-
packing effect. Thus, in the present research, support theory
predicts P(A)+P(B)+P(C)+P(D) > 1.0, in violation of the
unitarity axiom, which requires that these probabilities sum
to unity. The unitarity axiom also requires that the binary
complements P(H) and P(F) sum to 1.0, although support
theory predicts agreement with the axiom in the case of bi-
nary complements. Some studies find agreement with sup-
port theory’s prediction for binary complements (e.g., Dhami
& Mandel, 2013; Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997; Wallsten,
Budescu&Zwick, 1993), whereas others find that the sum of
the probabilities people assign to binary complements is less
than unity (e.g., Baratgin & Noveck, 2000; Macchi, Osher-
son & Krantz, 1999; Mandel, 2008; Sloman, Rottenstreich,
Wisniewski, Hadjichristidis & Fox, 2004). Consistent with
the latter studies, Mandel (2015b) found that intelligence an-
alysts who were given a series of binary classification tasks
to complete provided total probabilities for binary comple-
ments that fell significantly short of unity, although analysts’
performance was improved through training in Bayesian rea-
soning using natural sampling trees. In the present research,
we tested whether ACH would have a beneficial effect on the
degree to which analysts’ posterior probability judgments
respected the unitarity axiom.
Our investigation into the coherence of analysts’ probabil-
ity judgments was also motivated by the aim of testing the
value of statistical, post-judgment methods for improving
judgment accuracy. As noted earlier, recent research shows
that coherentizing probability judgments so that they respect
axioms of probability calculus such as additivity and unitar-
ity can significantly improve judgment accuracy (Karvetski,
Olson, Mandel et al., 2013). Moreover, individual differ-
ences in the coherence of individuals’ judgments can be
exploited as a basis for performance weighting contributions
to aggregated estimates, making the “crowds wiser” than
they would tend to be if each member’s contribution had
equal weight (Osherson & Vardi, 2006; Predd, Osherson,
Kulkarni & Poor, 2008; Tsai & Kirlik, 2012; Wang, Kulka-
rni, Poor & Osherson, 2011). Karvetski, Olson, Mandel et
al. (2013) found that the accuracy of probability judgments
about the truth of answers to general knowledge questions
was improved through coherentizing the judgments, and a
further substantial improvement was achieved by coherence
weighting the coherentized judgments. In the present re-
search, we examined how effective coherentization and co-
herence weighting are for improving the accuracy of in-
telligence analysts’ probability judgments. We compared
coherentized judgments to raw probability judgments gen-
erated with or without the use of ACH. We also compared
coherence-weighted aggregate estimates to an equal-weight
linear opinion pool (LINOP), which is the arithmetic aver-
age across judges (Clemen&Winkler, 1999). Our interest in
this issue was two-fold: First, we aimed to assess the external
validity of earlier findings in this nascent area of research on
coherentization and coherence-weighted aggregation. Sec-
ond, we aimed to test whether these post-judgment methods
hold promise for organizations, such as intelligence agencies,
that generate expert judgment as a product or service.
A further aim of this research anticipated both a possi-
ble benefit and a possible drawback of ACH. We hypothe-
sized that ACHwill not foster greater accuracy in probability
judgment because, as we noted earlier, there are processes
in the technique, such as disregarding evidential support in
information integration, that are normatively indefensible.
However, ACH does require analysts to evaluate each piece
of information in relation to each hypothesis on the same
criterion (consistency). We hypothesized that this might
improve analysts’ abilities to extract the usefulness of the
evidence. Accordingly, we asked analysts to rate the infor-
mation usefulness of each of the evidential cues presented
and we examined how well these ratings correlated, on av-
erage, with the probability gain of the cue, a measure of the
extent to which knowledge of the cue value is likely to im-
prove classification accuracy (Baron, 1981, cited in Baron,
1985; Nelson, 2005).
A related aim of ours was to examine whether analysts
who display stronger correlations with sampling norms also
show better probability judgment accuracy, and whether this
“meta-relationship” might differ between ACH and control
groups. For instance, ACH proponents might be willing to
wager that analysts who use ACH are more likely to reliably
encode the information value and to use that information to
their advantage by making more accurate judgments.
2 Method
2.1 Participants
Fifty UK intelligence analysts participated in the experiment
during regular working hours and did not receive additional
compensation for their participation. All participants were
pre-registered for intelligence training and were asked by the
trainers to participate in the experiment. Mean agewas 27.79
years (SD = 5.03) and mean length of experience working
as an analyst was 14.08 months (SD = 29.50). Out of 44
participants who indicated their sex, 25 (57%) were male.
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Table 1: Informational features of experimental task. Values represent cue likelihoods.
Tribe (base rate)
Evidential cues Acanda (.05) Bango (.20) Conda (.30) Dengo (.45) Feature Present in Target
Under 40 years .10 .10 .90 .90 Yes
Use social media .75 .50 .25 .50 Yes
Speak Zebin .50 .75 .50 .25 Yes
Employed .25 .25 .10 .10 Yes
Practice religion .90 .90 .10 .10 No
From large family .25 .50 .75 .50 No
Educated to age 16 .50 .25 .50 .75 No
Have high-SES .75 .75 .90 .90 No
Speak Zimban .75 .25 .75 .25 Yes
Have political affiliation .75 .25 .75 .25 No
Wear traditional clothing .75 .50 .60 .40 Yes
Fair coloured skin .25 .50 .40 .60 No
2.2 Design and procedure
Participants were randomly assigned in balanced numbers
to one of two conditions of the tradecraft factor: the ACH
(i.e., tradecraft) condition or the no-ACH (i.e., no tradecraft)
control condition. In the ACH condition, participants com-
pleted their scheduled ACH training, which was based on
Heuer and Pherson (2014) and related material from Pher-
son Associates, LLC. Participants in the control condition
received ACH training after the experiment. Participants
completed a paper and pencil questionnaire and were subse-
quently debriefed in small group sessions within the organi-
zation in which they worked. However, participants worked
individually on the task. Participants in the ACH condi-
tion were instructed to approach the judgment task using the
eight steps of the ACH method, whereas participants in the
control condition were free to use whatever approach they
favored. The experiment received ethical approved from the
institutional review board of Middlesex University.
2.3 Materials
Participants read about a fictitious case in which they were
required to assess the tribe membership of a randomly se-
lected person from a region called Zuma.1 They read that
there were four tribes (A-D) that constituted 5%, 20%, 30%,
and 45% of Zuma, respectively. Each tribe was then de-
scribed in terms of 12 probabilistic cue attributes. For in-
stance, for the Acanda tribe (i.e., Tribe A) the description
read:
1Full instructions for ACH and control conditions are available as sup-
plements.
Acanda: 10% of the tribe is under 40 years of
age, 75% use social media, 50% speak Zebin (one
of two languages spoken in Zuma), 25% are em-
ployed, 90% practice a religion, 25% come from a
large family (i.e., more than 4 children), 50% have
been educated up to the age of 16, 75% have a
reasonably high socio-economic status relative to
the general population, 75% speak Zimban (one
of two languages spoken in Zuma), 75% have a
political affiliation, 75% wear traditional clothing,
and 25% have fair coloured skin.
Next, the target’s cue attributes were described as follows:
The target is under 40 years of age, uses social me-
dia, speaks Zebin, is employed, does not practice
a religion, does not come from a large family, does
not have education up to age 16, does not have
a reasonably high socio-economic status, speaks
Zimban, is not politically affiliated, wears tradi-
tional clothing, and does not have fair coloured
skin.
Thus, the target had positive values for half of the cues and
negative values for the other half. Furthermore, analysts
were told to assume that the target’s answers were truth-
ful (due to the administration of a truth serum) in order to
ameliorate any possible effects of participants perceiving the
information as unreliable or deceptive. Table 1 summarizes
the informational features of the task.
In the ACH condition, participants were asked to com-
plete the eight steps of the ACH method (see supplementary
materials for full instructions), which included: (a) identify-
ing all possible hypotheses, (b) listing significant evidence
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that is relevant for evaluating the hypotheses, (c) creating
a matrix with all the hypotheses as columns and all items
of relevant information as rows and then rating the consis-
tency of each piece of evidence with each hypothesis, (d)
revising the matrix after omitting non-diagnostic evidence,
(e) calculating the inconsistency scores by taking the sum
of the inconsistent values and using that to draw tentative
conclusions about the relative likelihood of the hypotheses,
(f) analyzing the sensitivity of conclusions to a change in the
interpretation of a few critical items of relevant information,
(g) reporting conclusions, and (h) identifying indicators for
future observation.
By comparison, in the control condition, participants were
asked to “consider the relative likelihood of all of the hy-
potheses, state which items of information were the most
diagnostic, and how compelling a case they make in iden-
tifying the most likely hypothesis, and also say why alter-
native hypotheses were rejected.” They were provided with
two pages of blank paper on which to respond (none asked
for more paper).
All participants completed the same final page of the ques-
tionnaire. The first four questions prompted analysts for the
probability that the target belonged to each of the four tribes
(A-D). Next, they were asked for the probability that the
target was friendly and also for the probability that the target
was hostile. Probability judgments were made on a 101-
point scale that shows numeric probabilities starting at 0 and
continuing at every 5% increment up to 100. The instruc-
tions noted that 0% meant “impossible” and 100% meant
“absolutely certain.” Next participants rated on an unnum-
bered 11-point scale, ranging from not at all to completely,
how useful each of the 12 cues was in assessing which the
target’s tribemembership. For the purpose of statistical anal-
ysis, these ratings were entered as values ranging from 1 to
11. We examined analysts’ responses to the scale measures
of probability and information usefulness.
2.4 Coherentization and coherence weighting
As described previously, more often than not, individuals
produce probability estimates that are incoherent and violate
probability axioms, and there is evidence that more coher-
ent estimates are associated with more accurate estimates
(Mellers, Baker, Chen, Mandel & Tetlock, 2017). Given a
set or vector of elicited probabilities that is incoherent, the
coherent approximation principle (CAP; Osherson & Vardi,
2006; Predd et al., 2008) was proposed to obtain a coher-
ent set of probabilities that is minimally different in terms
of Euclidean distance from the elicited probabilities with
the goal of improving accuracy. This “closest” set of co-
herent probabilities is found by projecting the incoherent
probabilities onto the coherent space of probabilities. An
incoherence metric can then be defined as the Euclidean dis-
tance from an incoherent set of probabilities to the closest
coherent set of probabilities. For example, if an analyst in
the present research provided probability judgments of .2,
.3, .4, and .3 for the four MECE hypotheses A-D, respec-
tively, these estimates are incoherent because they sum to a
value greater than 1 and thus violate the unitarity constraint.
Using the CAP and (if needed) quadratic programming (see
Karvetski, Olson, Mandel et al., 2013) a coherent set of re-
calibrated probabilities can be obtained, which minimizes
the Euclidean distance between the point {.2, .3, .4, .3} and
all quartet vectors with values between 0 and 1, such that the
sum of the four values is 1. For this example, the probabil-
ities of .15, .25, .35, and .25 represent the closest coherent
set, with minimum distance as follows:√
(.2 − .15)2 + (.3 − .25)2 + (.4 − .35)2 + (.3 − .25)2 = .10.
The resulting value, moreover, represents an incoherence
metric, expressed, more generally, as
IM =
√√
K∑
i=1
(yi − y
c
i
)2. (1)
In Equation 1, IM is calculated over the sum of k judg-
ments that form a related set, and notably IM is zero when
elicited judgments are perfectly coherent. The CAP is not
limited to using only the unitarity constraint but can be ap-
pliedwith any set of coherence constraints that can be defined
mathematically as an optimization program.
As noted earlier, variations in IM across individuals can
also be used as a basis for performance-weighted aggrega-
tion. With IM j as the incoherence metric for the j
th indi-
vidual in an aggregate, a weighting function should satisfy
general properties. First, it should be strictly decreasing as
IM j increases, thus assigning harsher penalties to more inco-
herent individuals. Because weights are normalized during
the aggregation, only the ratio values of weights are relevant.
Thus, the function can be arbitrarily scaled in the [0, 1] in-
terval, with 1 representing a perfectly coherent judge. In the
present research, we use a weighting function similar to that
of Wang et al. (2011)
ωj = e
−IM j ·β . (2)
The weighting function assigns full weight to the j th indi-
vidual if IM j = 0 or if β = 0. In the former case, this
is due to the perfect coherence of j’s raw estimates, while
in the latter case the weighting function is nondiscrimina-
tory and equivalent to taking the arithmetic average across
individuals.
Next, we define the coherence-weighted average of n
(where 2≤n≤N) individuals’ coherentized probability judg-
ments of the ith hypothesis as
y¯
cc
i =
∑n
j=1 ωj y
c
i j∑n
j=1 ωj
. (3)
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Again, if β = 0, we have an equal-weighted (arithmetic)
average of the coherentized judgments
y¯
c
i =
1
n
n∑
j=1
y
c
i j . (4)
Note that the coherence constraints on yc
i j
imply that set of
all coherent probabilities is a convex set, and any linear com-
bination of elements from a convex set is again an element
of the same set. Therefore, the aggregated estimates must
also be coherent and do not have to be coherentized again.
In the present research, we let β = 5, and we later show
that the results are not sensitive to the exact value chosen.
Choosing a sufficiently large value alleviates the issue with
the “fifty-fifty blip”, which results when an individual ex-
presses epistemic uncertainty by responding .5 over multiple
judgments (Bruine de Bruin Fischbeck, Stiber & Fischhoff,
2002). In the present research, if an analyst entered .5 for
each hypothesis, A-D, the values would sum to 2, and the
participant’s IM score would be .50. In the weighting func-
tion, we have ω(.50) = .082. This participant would be
assigned only 8.2% of the weight that would be assigned to
a perfectly coherent participant.
2.5 Metrics
The primary measure of accuracy we use is mean absolute
error (MAE), which in this research computes the mean ab-
solute difference between a human-originated judgment (i.e.,
raw, transformed, or aggregated), yi , and the corresponding
posterior probabilities derived from Bayes theorem assum-
ing class conditional independence (i.e., a “naïve Bayes”
model), xi . We acknowledge that this simplifying assump-
tion is not necessitated by the task. However, we believe it is
reasonable to assume that participants did not perceive con-
ditional dependence and subsequently take it into account—
at least we found no evidence to support such a conclusion
in participants’ responses. Using the naïve Bayes model,
xA = .08, xB = .15, xC4 = .46, and xD = .31. Accordingly,
MAE =
1
kn
k∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|yi j − xi |. (5)
The summation over i refers to the set of hypotheses (i.e., in
this research, k = 4).
An advantage of MAE over mean squared error or root
mean squared error is that it is less susceptible to outliers
(Armstrong, 2001; Wilmott &Matsuura, 2005). In addition,
MAE is decomposable into quantity disagreement (QD) and
allocation disagreement (AD):
QD = |ME |, where MD =
1
kn
k∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(yi j − xi).
(6)
AD = MAE = QD. (7)
QD is the absolute value of mean error (ME) or bias. AD
represents remaining inaccuracy after removal of QD (i.e.,
absolute bias), which necessarily involves a fair balance be-
tween under- and over-estimations of correct values (i.e., any
imbalance is part of QD). Coherentization reduces MAE by
eliminating QD.
As noted earlier, we used a measure of classification ac-
curacy improvement called probability gain (Nelson, 2005)
to assess analysts’ accuracy in rating cue usefulness:
probability gain (Q) =

∑
qj
P(qj) max P(hi |qj)

. (8)
3 Results
3.1 Coherence of probability judgments
We tested the coherence of analysts’ probability judgments
as a function of tradecraft using the following logical con-
straints:
yA + yB + yC + yD = 1 unitary, quarternary partition.
(9)
yH + yF = 1 unitary, binary partition.
(10)
yH = yA+yC, yF = yB+yD additivity, two binary partitions.
(11)
Equations 9 and 10 reflect the unitarity axiom and Equation
11 reflects the additivity axiom.2 In violation of Equation 9
and showing a strong unpacking effect, the sum of the prob-
abilities assigned to the four MECE hypotheses significantly
exceeded unity in the control condition (M = 1.54 [1.33,
1.76], t[24] = 13.63, d = 0.96, p < 001) and in the ACH
condition (M = 1.77 [1.56, 1.97], t[24] = 19.53, d = 1.69,
p < .001). The unpacking effect did not significantly differ
between conditions, but the difference in the size of these
effects was nevertheless of medium effect size by Cohen’s
(1992) standards and favored the control group, ∆ = 0.22
[−0.08, 0.55], t[45.8)] = 1.55, d = 0.45, p = .13.
In contrast, but consistent with several studies also finding
unitarity for binary complements (e.g., Brenner & Rotten-
streich, 1999; Dhami & Mandel, 2013; Mandel, 2005; Tver-
sky & Koehler, 1994), the total probability assigned to the
binary complements, H and F, did not significantly differ
from unity in either the control condition (M = 0.98 [0.90,
1.04], t[24] = 27.38, d = 0.12, p < .001) or the ACH con-
dition (M = 0.95 [0.83, 1.00], t[24] = 23.45, d = 0.25,
2Square brackets show bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals from
1,000 bias-corrected and accelerated samples, ∆ denotes the mean differ-
ence between conditions, and d refers to the effect size estimator, Cohen’s
d.
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p < .001). Thus, on average, analysts respected the unitarity
constraint imposed by Equation 10.
Turning to tests of additivity, we computed the sum of the
(signed) non-additivity (SSN):
SSN = (yA + yC − yH ) + (yB + yD − yF ). (12)
If Equation 12 is respected, SSN = 0. However, it is evident
that implicit disjunctions were assigned significantly less
probability than what was assigned, in sum, to their con-
stituents in both the ACH condition (M = 0.82 [0.64, 0.99],
t[24] = 8.98, d = 1.80, p < .001) and the control condition
(M = 0.56 [0.37, 0.74], t[24] = 5.34, d = 1.07, p < .001).
In addition, mean additivity violation, consistent with the
unpacking effect, was marginally greater in the ACH condi-
tion than in the control condition, ∆ = 0.25 [−0.05, 0.57],
t(48) = 1.81, d = 0.52, p = .08. Once again, this difference
was of medium effect size.
3.2 Accuracy of probability judgments
As noted earlier, we compared the accuracy of analysts’ un-
transformed (i.e., not coherentized) probability judgments
for the four-way MECE partition (i.e., Tribes A-D) using
analysts’ MAE calculated over the four estimates. Although
there was a significant degree of inaccuracy in both the con-
trol condition (MAE = 0.21 [0.17, 0.26], t[24] = 9.69,
d = 1.94, p < .001) and the ACH condition (MAE = 0.26
[0.22, 0.29], t[24] = 14.39, d = 2.88, p < .001), the effect
of tradecraft was not significant, ∆ = 0.04 [−0.02, 0.11],
t(45.9) = 1.49, d = 0.43, p = .14. Nevertheless, as the
effect-size estimate reveals, there was a medium-sized effect
of tradecraft that, once again, favored the control group.
The observed MAE in the sample was also compared to
that obtained from 10,000 random draws of probability val-
ues for each of the four hypotheses, A-D (i.e., where each
probability was drawn from a uniform distribution over the
[0, 1] interval — a simulated dart-throwing chimp, to use
Tetlock’s [2005] metaphor). MAE for the random judgments
was 0.33. Thus, analysts performed significantly better than
chance, analysts’ MAE = 0.23 [0.21, 0.26], t(49) = 6.69,
d = 0.95, p < .001.
Given that theQD decomposition ofMAE calculated over
the four MECE hypotheses is directly related to unitarity
violation and, further, given that we have established that
this type of coherence violation is greater in the ACH con-
dition than in the control condition, we can verify that the
proportion of total inaccuracy (MAE) accounted for by QD
is greater in the ACH condition than in the control condi-
tion. In fact, this was confirmed: The QD/MAE proportion
was .73 [.60, .86] in the ACH condition and .50 [.32, .67]
in the control condition, a significant effect of medium size,
∆ = .23 [.04, .45], t(45.7) = 2.08, d = 0.60, p = .04.
Although the preceding analyses do not indicate that ACH
helps to improve analysts’ probability judgments, critics
might argue that the method is not aimed at minimizing
absolute error but rather at improving the rank ordering of
alternative hypotheses in terms of their probability of be-
ing correct. To address this point, we calculated the rank-
order (Spearman) correlation between each analyst’s four
raw probability judgments of A-D and the probability vec-
tor of the naïve Bayes model. The mean correlations in
the ACH condition (M = .29 [.02, .55]) and the control
condition (M = .24 [−.08, .55] did not significantly differ,
t[46.9] = 0.28, d = 0.08, p = .78. Therefore, we find no
support for the hypothesis that ACH helped analysts to better
assess the relative probability of the four hypotheses.
3.3 Information usefulness
As noted earlier, we hypothesized that the consistency rating
process in ACH, which requires analysts to assess each piece
of evidence for consistency with each hypothesis, and the
subsequent diagnosticity assessment process, which requires
analysts to consider information usefulness, might help an-
alysts capture variation in information utility. Accordingly,
we computed the Pearson correlation between each analyst’s
ratings of the information usefulness of the 12 cues and the
probability gain values for those cues. Providing support for
the preceding hypothesis, the mean correlation in the ACH
condition (M = .68 [.61, .75]) was significantly greater than
the mean value in the control condition (M = .17 [−.02,
.35]), and the effect size was very large, t[29.5] = 5.35,
d = 1.59, p < .001.
Next, we examined whether these correlations were them-
selves related to analysts’MAE scores. Overall, this correla-
tion was non-significant, r(49) = −.14 [−.39, .15], p = .53.
However, the observed relationship was strikingly different
between the two conditions. The correlation was negligible
in the ACH condition, r(24) = −.10 [−.44, .28], p = .63,
but it was significant and of medium-to-large effect size in
the control condition, r(24) = −.42 [−.69, −.07], p = .045.
Although analysts using ACHwere more likely than analysts
in the control condition to track the variation in probability
gain with their usefulness ratings, the degree to which the
ACH group tracked probability gain had almost no corre-
spondence to their accuracy, whereas it did for the control
group.
3.4 Recalibrating probability judgments
The substantial degree of nonadditivity observed in analysts’
probability judgments implies that recalibration procedures
that coherentize the judgments will not only ensure coher-
ence, they will also benefit accuracy by eliminating the QD
component of MAE. Thus, we coherentized analysts’ prob-
ability judgments of A-D so that they respected the unitar-
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Figure 1: Accuracy of probability judgments by group size and aggregation method.
ity constraint in Equation 9.3 The coherentized probability
judgments (MAE = 0.15 [0.13, 0.18]) were significantly
more accurate than the raw judgments (MAE = 0.23 [0.21,
0.26]), ∆ = −0.08 [−0.11, −0.06], t[49] = 6.77, d = 0.96,
p < .001. This represents a 35% reduction in MAE and ap-
proximately a 1 SD improvement. Recall that the proportion
of MAE attributable to QD was significantly greater in the
ACH condition than in the control condition. This suggests
that the effect of coherentizing will be stronger in the ACH
condition. In fact, d = 0.69 in the control condition and d =
1.37 in the ACH condition. Therefore, the SD improvement
is roughly twice as large in the ACH condition as it is in the
control condition. Moreover, after coherentizing, the effect
of tradecraft on accuracy is negligible, ∆ = 0.01 [−0.04,
0.07].
We once again compared analysts’ judgment accuracy to
the performance of the average dart-throwing chimp. How-
ever, this timewe coherentized the randomly generated prob-
abilities, which yieldedMAE = 0.21, a value that was signif-
icantly inferior to the observed coherentized MAE of 0.15,
t[49] = 4.56, d = 0.64, p < .001. An alternative method
of assessing chance is to define it in terms of all possible
permutations of the probabilities actually provided by each
participant, rather than as a uniform distribution. Using this
definition, the superiority of the analysts over chance was
still apparent but not as large: 0.16 for chance, 0.13 for the
participants (t(49) = 2.75, p = .008), a difference of about
3An alternative form of coherentization that used Equations 9 and 11
was also tested but found to be virtually indistinguishable. Thus, we used
the simpler form.
0.03 rather than 0.06.4 This analysis suggests that probability
judgments were in the right range, but they were conveying
very little information about the relative probabilities of the
four hypotheses, this reducing the power of the experiment
to detect group differences.
3.5 Aggregating probability judgments
Coherentization yielded a large improvement in the accu-
racy of analysts’ probability judgments. We examined how
much further improvement in accuracy might be achieved by
aggregating analysts’ probability judgments. To do so, we
generated 1,000 bootstrap samples of statistical group sizes
ranging from 1 (i.e., no aggregation) to 49 in increments of
two. We aggregated probability judgments in two ways: us-
ing an unweighted arithmetic average of coherentized proba-
bility judgments and using a coherence-weighted average of
such estimates.5 We examined the effect of aggregation on
MAE aswell as on the average Spearman correlation between
the aggregated estimates and the vector of values from the
naïve Bayes model. As a benchmark, we also examined the
effect of these aggregation methods on random responses,
where each data point is based on 1,000 simulations of prob-
ability judgments from a uniform distribution over the [0, 1]
interval.
4JonBaron conducted this analysis and used normalization (i.e., dividing
each stated probability by the sum of the four) rather than coherentization
as the recalibration method.
5For coherence-weighted aggregation, β = 5. However, as shown in the
supplementary figure, the effect of coherence weighting was robust across
a wide parametric range.
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Figure 2: Probability of improvement achieved by increasing group size by one member. Bars show 95% confidence intervals
from 1,000 bootstrap samples. The reference line shows the probability of improvement by chance.
As Figure 1 shows, these analyses yield several impor-
tant findings. First, they confirm that, when aggregated,
analysts’ judgments are substantially more accurate than ag-
gregated random judgments. Second, it is evident from the
left panel in Figure 1 that aggregation greatly improves ac-
curacy in analysts’ judgments, but to a degree comparable
to that observed in the randomly generated response data.
This suggests that most of the error reduction observed is
due to variance reduction from averaging and should not be
attributed to an eking out of any crowd wisdom, as clearly
there is no wisdom in the random response data.6 Third,
it is equally evident from the right panel in Figure 1 that
aggregation over increasingly larger group sizes steadily in-
creases the correct rank ordering of probabilities. This effect
is clearly not manifested in random response data, where
aggregation has no benefit. Fourth, aggregation with coher-
ence weighting did not outperform aggregation with equal
weighting; in fact, it slightly underperformed. Finally, the
left panel in Figure 1 shows that most error reduction due to
aggregation was achieved with small group sizes. Figure 2
clarifies that there was a significantly greater the proportion
of cases where MAE was lower for a group size of two than
for single individuals (i.e., the probability of improvement),
and likewise the stepwise increase in group size from two to
three significantly increased the proportion with lowerMAE
6Note that aggregation of random responses will bring all responses
closer to .25. In the limit, the MAE of this constant response may be lower
than that for a set of responses with excessive variability.
scores. However, no additional stepwise increase in group
size yielded significant improvements.
Finally, we assessed the proportional gain in accuracy
achieved by recalibration and equal-weight aggregation
when n = 50. As noted earlier, coherentizing the disag-
gregated judgments yielded a 35% reduction inMAE. If we
combine coherentization with equal-weight aggregation of
the full sample of 50 analysts, we obtain MAE = 0.09, a
61% reduction in MAE over the value for analysts’ original
probability judgments (i.e., MAE = .23). That is, 61% of
the inaccuracy of analysts’ probabilistic assessments of the
target’s category membership was eliminated by first coher-
entizing those assessments and then taking an unweighted
average of them prior to scoring.
4 Discussion
Although intelligence organizations routinely train and ad-
vise analysts to use tradecraft methods, such as ACH, to
mitigate cognitive biases and thereby improve the coherence
and accuracy of their assessments, there has been a dire lack
of research on their effectiveness. The present research con-
ducted such a test and found that ACH failed to improve
intelligence analysts’ probabilistic judgments about alterna-
tive hypotheses. It even had a small detrimental effect on
some measures of coherence and accuracy. In such cases,
the comparison between conditions yielded a medium effect
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size in favor of the control group. To better understand the
advantage of not using ACH in the present research task, it is
helpful to convert the effect size into a stochastic superiority
or probability of superiority estimate equal to the area under
the receiver-operator characteristic curve in signal detection
theory (Grissom & Kim, 2005; Ruscio & Mullen, 2012;
Vargha & Delaney, 2000). The probability of superiority
is the probability that a randomly selected member of one
condition will outperform a randomly selected member of
another condition. For accuracy, for instance, the effect size,
d = 0.45, yields a probability of superiority estimate equal
to .62 favoring the control condition. That is, if one analyst
were randomly drawn from the ACH condition and another
randomly drawn from the control condition, there would be
a 62% chance of the former having worse accuracy than the
latter.
Comparable probabilities of superiority favoring the con-
trol condition likewise are obtained in tests of unitarity and
additivity. In each case, coherence violations conformed to
the unpacking effect predicted by support theory (Rottenstre-
ich & Tversky, 1997; Tversky & Koehler, 1994). As noted
earlier, the unpacking effect refers to the tendency for people
to assign greater total probability to the sum of a MECE par-
tition of a disjunctive event (in the case of additivity) or an
event space (in the case of unitarity). The unpacking effect
has been shown to undermine the logical coherence of geopo-
litical assessments (Tetlock & Lebow, 2001), which suggests
that such forms of incoherence can undermine strategic in-
telligence assessments. Indeed, compared to regular fore-
casters, elite super-forecasters of geopolitical topics tend to
display greater coherence on other, unrelated probabilistic
tasks (Mellers et al., 2017). It should concern the intel-
ligence community that a commonplace analytic tradecraft
technique served to increase (rather than reduce) this form
of judgmental error.
Of course, critics might argue that perhaps analysts inter-
preted the request for probabilities as requiring only a relative
probability assessment of the hypotheses. After all, ACH is
primarily aimed at ranking hypotheses by likelihood, and for
that reason our control analysts were also instructed to as-
sess the relative likelihoods of the hypotheses. However, we
elicited probabilities for each hypothesis separately on a scale
covering the [0, 1] interval. Moreover, the four probabilities
(A-D) that are bound by the unitarity axiom were elicited in
immediate succession, an elicitation feature shown to miti-
gate incoherence (Mandel, 2005). Therefore, we expect to
find even greater incoherence in analytic practice where the
logical relations between assessments are likely to be ob-
scured. Finally, we found that the rank-order correlations
between analysts’ judgments and the correct values were
small, on average, having only about 7% shared variance.
Another striking result of the present research concerns
the relationship between the quality of analysts’ information
usefulness evaluations and the quality of their probability
judgments regarding the alternative hypotheses. Although
analysts who used ACH provided ratings of probabilistic cue
usefulness that were more strongly correlated with the cues’
probability gain values than analysts who did not use ACH,
the former group’s assessments of information usefulness
did virtually nothing to guide them to exploit the knowledge
effectively to boost accuracy in probability judgments. In
contrast, among analysts in the control group, there was sub-
stantially better correspondence between accuracy and the
degree to which their usefulness ratings tracked probabil-
ity gain. Analysts in the control group whose usefulness
ratings tracked probability gain were better poised than ana-
lysts in the ACH group to use that knowledge to improve the
accuracy of their probability assessments. This finding was
unanticipated and should ideally be tested for reproducibility
in future research.
While speculative, one explanation for the disconnect be-
tween accurate evaluation of information usefulness and
accuracy of probability judgments is that the consistency-
encoding phase in ACH prompts analysts to adopt a per-
spective that is evidence-contingent rather than hypothesis-
contingent. That is, analysts are taught to evaluate evidence-
hypothesis consistency within pieces of evidence and across
hypotheses rather than the other way around. This approach
is deliberate, reflecting Heuer’s (1999) belief that analysts
are susceptible to confirmation bias and thus need to be
made to focus on evidence rather than their preferred hy-
pothesis. The evidence-contingent approach should prompt
consideration of information usefulness given that the con-
sistency between a piece of evidence and each hypothesis be-
ing evaluated is assessed before proceeding to another piece
of evidence. However, we see that information integration
within hypotheses is left to the questionable “sum of the in-
consistency scores” rule in ACH. Unlike a normative (e.g.,
Bayesian) approach, this rule merely serves as a summator
and, moreover, selectively so by choosing to ignore scores
that indicate degree of positive consistency. The integration
rule is also exceptionally coarse in its treatment of evidence,
assigning one of only three levels (−2, −1, 0) to each piece of
evidence, and such coarseness is likely to impede judgment
accuracy (Friedman, Baker, Mellers, Tetlock & Zeckhauser,
2018).
Moreover, ACH does virtually nothing as an analytic sup-
port tool to ensure that analysts consistently map evidential
strength onto −1 and −2 ratings. Consider two hypotheses,
A and B. Assume that given five pieces of evidence, three
analysts, X, Y, and Z agreed on the following. All five pieces
of evidence are inconsistent with A and three pieces are in-
consistent with B. Assume further that compared to Y, X has
a low threshold for assigning −2 ratings, and Z has a high
threshold. All three analysts might agree that the five pieces
of evidence are inconsistent with A, but not strongly so, and
they would assign -1 for each piece. They might further
agree that the three pieces of evidence that are inconsistent
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with B are stronger in their inconsistency than in the case
of A, but given their differing thresholds for assigning −2
ratings, they may vary in their ratings. For instance, X might
assign −2 to the three pieces that are inconsistent with B, Y
might assign, two −2 ratings and one −1 rating, and Z might
assign −1 ratings to each of the three pieces of evidence in-
consistent with B. If so, in spite of the substantial agreement
among analysts, using ACH, X would judge A less probable
than B, Y would judge A and B as equally probable, and Z
would judge A as more probable than B!
The present findings indicate that ACH is ineffective as a
means of supporting analysts in assessment tasks requiring
the integration of uncertain evidence in order to evaluate
a set of hypotheses. The findings challenge a widespread
assumption among tradecraft professionals in intelligence
organizations that, although ACH (and SATs, in general)
might not always help the analyst, at least they don’t hurt
the analyst (Mandel & Tetlock, 2018). Two of the authors
(DRMandMKD)who haveworked for several yearswith an-
alytic tradecraft professionals have repeatedly encountered a
“nothing to lose” attitude when it comes to SAT training and
on-the-job use. Yet, our findings suggest that, in fact, ACH
can impede the quality of intelligence assessments. It can
do so in two ways: first, by undermining the coherence and
accuracy of estimates and, second, by fostering a disconnec-
tion between evidence evaluation and hypothesis evaluation.
We therefore urge intelligence organizations to be more cir-
cumspect about the benefits of training analysts to use ACH
and other SATs that have not received adequate testing.
Indeed, a commonplace rebuttal from intelligence profes-
sionals to any criticism of tradecraft methods is that although
they aren’t perfect, intelligence organizations can’t just “do
nothing.” The idea of leaving analysts to their own “intu-
itive” reasoning is thought to — and often does — result in
bias and error. Our findings challenge this assumption since
analysts who were left to their own devices performed better
than analysts who used ACH.
SAT proponents are likely to object and claim that our
findings lack external validity. After all, intelligence ana-
lysts seldom are presented with such neat problems where
all evidence is precisely quantified and expresses relative
frequencies and where the full set of pertinent hypotheses is
explicit and, further, it is evident that these hypotheses are
also neatly partitioned (i.e., MECE). We agree that in these
and other respects the experimental task we used lacks mun-
dane realism. However, we disagree with the implications
that proponents would likely draw from such observations.
Intelligence problems are murkier in many respects — the
quality of evidence will be variable, the hypotheses might
be unclearly defined and will often fail to yield a MECE set,
and analysts are likely to give no more than vague probabil-
ity estimates on coarse verbal probability scales (Dhami et
al., 2015; Friedman et al., 2018; Mandel, in press; Mandel
& Barnes, 2018). We see no compelling reason why ACH
should help under those conditions when it does not help
hypothesis evaluation under the much more modest require-
ments of the present experimental task. Indeed, it is possible
that ACH can do even more harm to judgment when analysts
use it on the job.
Clearly, it would be beneficial to conduct research in the
future that uses tasks that aremore challenging in the respects
noted while permitting unambiguous evaluation of the mer-
its of ACH or other SATs. However, the present research
already shows that ACH is not an all-purpose judgment cor-
rective for problems involving the evaluation of multiple hy-
potheses on the basis of uncertain evidence. In fact, the poor
performance of both groups of analysts in this research raise
a more basic question: why were they so inaccurate on a task
(even in terms of their relative probability judgments) that is
arguably much easier than the types of so-called puzzles and
mysteries they encounter on the job? This may ultimately
prove to be a more important finding than the relative per-
formance between conditions. In the present task, analysts
had unambiguous sources of accurate information that they
could exploit, yet most were at a loss do so regardless of
whether they used ACH or not. Our findings therefore raise
a fundamental question about the competence of analysts to
judge probabilities. Given the small and homogeneous sam-
ple of analysts we tested, it would bewrong to draw sweeping
generalizations. Yet, if our findings do generalize across a
wide range of analyst samples, it should prompt the intel-
ligence community and the bodies that provide intelligence
oversight to take stock of the practical significance of the
findings and study the putative causes of poor performance.
We also respond to SAT proponents by noting that “doing
nothing” is not the only alternative to using conventional
analytic tradecraft techniques such as ACH. In this research,
we examined two promising statistical methods that intelli-
gence organizations could use to improve probability judg-
ments after analysts had provided judgments — methods we
accordingly describe as post-analytic. One method, coher-
entization, exploits the logical structure of related queries by
recalibrating probability assessments so that they conform
to one or more axioms of probability calculus. As noted
earlier, Karvetski, Olson, Mandel et al. (2013) showed that
such methods substantially improve the accuracy of prob-
ability judgments. Likewise, in the present experiment, a
large improvement in analysts’ accuracy was achieved by
coherentizing analysts’ probability judgments such that they
respected the unitarity axiom. This method fully counter-
acted the unpacking effect exhibited by analysts in this re-
search, especially those who were instructed to use ACH.
We view CAP-based coherentization as illustrative rather
than definitive. Other recalibration methods might be even
more effective or easier to apply. For instance, in the present
research, we could have coherentized probabilities by sim-
ple normalization (i.e., dividing each by their sum), as re-
searchers sometimes do as a step in the statistical analysis of
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probability judgment data (e.g., Prims&Moore, 2017, Study
2). This method (as noted in Section 3.4) would have yielded
even slightly better accuracy than CAP-based coherentiza-
tion (MAE = 0.13 for normalization, vs. 0.15 for CAP). Our
study is clearly not designed to examine such competitions
given it relies on a single vector of values defining proba-
bilistic accuracy. However, our findings suggest that research
comparing optimization methods using such techniques un-
der a broad range of task conditions are needed.
Another post-analytic method intelligence organizations
could use to boost the accuracy of probabilistic assessments
is to aggregate them across small numbers of analysts. We
found that substantial benefits to accuracy were achieved by
taking the arithmetic average of as few as three analysts.
These findings are consistent with earlier studies showing
that most of the advantage from aggregating can be achieved
with between two to five judges (e.g., Ashton & Ashton,
1985; Libby & Blashfield, 1978; Winkler & Clemen, 2004).
Moreover, we found that a simple equal-weighted aggre-
gate of analysts’ judgments yielded comparable benefit to
the more complex coherence-weighted aggregation method.
This result was unexpected given the superior performance
coherence weighting afforded over equal weighting in recent
studies (Karvetski, Olson, Mandel et al., 2013; Wang et al.,
2011). A key difference between the tasks in the present
research and Karvetski, Olson, Mandel et al. (2013) is that
the former included all information relevant to solving the
task, whereas the latter relied on participants’ knowledge of
world facts, such as who was the first person to walk on the
moon. Thus, whereas in the present research, coherentiza-
tion may have already reaped most of the benefit achievable
through coherenceweighting, in the earlier studies coherence
weighting might also have benefited accuracy by predicting
how knowledgeable participants were.
More generally, the present results indicate that intelli-
gence organizations should be exploring how to effectively
incorporate processes for eliciting judgments from multi-
ple analysts and then aggregating them in order to reduce
judgment error. At present, intelligence organizations rarely
capitalize on statistical methods such as the recalibration and
aggregation approaches shown to be effective in the present
research. Instead, the management of intelligence produc-
tion tends to rely on traditional methods such as having sole-
source analysts provide input to an all-source analyst (an
approach that is common at the operational level), or by hav-
ing a draft intelligence report reviewed by peers with relevant
domain expertise and by the analyst’s director (an approach
often employed at the strategic level). Still, we caution not
to infer too much from the aggregation results. It is tempting
to suggest that the aggregate divines the wisdom of crowds,
as Surowieki (2004) put it, yet our finding that aggregation
of random response data yielded comparable error reduction
as in analysts’ judgments clearly challenges that interpreta-
tion as there was no wisdom in the random data to divine.
Our analysis of how aggregates can improve relative proba-
bility assessment, however, showed a large improvement in
accurately capturing the rank ordering of probabilities, and
this benefit was entirely absent in the random response data,
which suggests that aggregation did in fact boost the signal-
to-noise ratio in analysts’ ordered probability judgments.
To conclude, we argue that the intelligence community
should look to recent examples of research that illustrate how
organizations could better integrate recalibration and aggre-
gation methods pioneered in decision science into day-to-
day analytic practices. One example involves the systematic
monitoring of probabilistic forecast accuracy within intelli-
gence organizations (e.g., Mandel, 2015a; Mandel &Barnes,
2018). The results of such monitoring have shown that ana-
lysts’ forecasts tend to be underconfident, and that the cali-
bration of intelligence units can be improved post-judgment
through an organizational recalibration process that “extrem-
izes” overly-cautious forecasts (Mandel & Barnes, 2014;
Baron et al., 2014; Turner et al., 2014). Another exam-
ple is the introduction in the US intelligence community of a
classified prediction market that poses forecasting questions
not unlike those worked on by strategic analysts as part of
their routine assessment responsibilities. Stastny and Lehner
(2018) showed that analysts’ forecasts within the prediction
market, which aggregated the forecasters’ estimates but also
shared the aggregated estimates with the forecasters, were
substantially more accurate than the same forecasts arrived
at through conventional analytic means. These examples il-
lustrate the benefits to analytic accuracy and accountability
that intelligence organizations could accrue if they leveraged
post-analytic mathematical methods for boosting the quality
of expert judgment.
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